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Conflict Theory 
 
 
Bjørn Møller*
 
In this paper, a typology of conflicts is offered, followed by an account of the 
typical conflict cycle.1 The following paper provides an overview of strategies, 
methods and instruments for conflict intervention, i.e. conflict prevention, 
management, mitigation and resolution. 
 
Levels of Conflict 
Conflicts occur at various levels, ranging from the international level of wars to 
the inter-personal level of marital disputes—to which one might even add  
“intrapersonal conflicts” as most dramatically illustrated by schizophrenia.2 (See 
Table 1). For our present purposes, however, a dichotomous distinction between 
conflicts within and between states seems adequate, albeit only with the addition 
of their combination in internationalised intra-state conflicts, here labelled 
“transnational conflicts”. It further makes sense to distinguish between violent 
and non-violent conflicts, and to acknowledge that neither the borders separating 
the various levels nor those between violent and non-violent conflicts are 
entirely clear or impermeable. 
 
Table 1: Taxonomy  
of Conflicts 
International Transnational  
 
Intra-state Inter-personal 
Violent War 
Other armed 
conflicts 
Cold War 
Military 
intervention 
Support for 
armed insurgents 
Civil wars 
Armed 
insurgencies 
Genocide 
Wife battering 
Child abuse 
Murder 
Violent crime 
Non-violent Political disputes 
Trade wars 
Sanctions 
Diplomacy 
Political 
struggle 
Verbal disputes 
Discrimination 
 
It would surely be tantamount to “reductionism” to assume conflicts to always 
follow the same pattern, regardless of the level,3 i.e. to assume “isomorphism” 
across the divides between levels.4 However, it makes perfect sense to make 
heuristic (and, of course, illustrative) use of accumulated knowledge about 
conflicts at one level for the analysis of conflicts at another. While one cannot 
assume that these will be structurally similar, it just might be the case. Also the 
commonly shared experience from conflicts at the interpersonal level may 
recommend such disputes for illustration (as opposed to explanation) of disputes 
at other levels, several steps removed from the daily experience.   
                                           
* Guest Professor, Research Center on Development and International Relations (DIR), 
Aalborg University. 
 
 
International Conflicts: Clausewitzian War and Beyond 
Conflicts between states occur over many different issues and come in many 
shapes. The issues of contention include such matters as territory, natural 
resources, power (entailing the ability to acquire all the rest, if need be by force) 
and prestige.5
 
Most such conflicts are, fortunately, peaceful and are fought out by means of 
diplomacy and other political instruments, often combined with economic means 
of persuasion or coercion. However, military means are often employed, either 
directly or indirectly, i.e. as means of deterrence or “compellence”, including 
“crisis management” as it is usually labelled in the post-Cold War jargon.6 In 
other cases, of course, military force is actually used for fighting. Genuine wars 
used to be clearly identifiable by being preceded by a declaration of war, but this 
has become a distinct rarity,7 calling for other criteria to distinguish “war” from 
“other armed conflicts”. 
 
The most obvious solution to this is to reserve the label “war” for armed 
conflicts among states and to stipulate a quantitative threshold above which 
something should be called a war rather than a mere “incident”, e.g. in terms of 
battle-deaths per year. 8 This still leaves some definitional problems, e.g. whether 
to count wars between several states as one comprehensive or several dyadic 
wars, and whether to count a war intersected by periods of peace as one or 
several consecutive wars.  
 
The traditional image of war is that of a rational endeavour of states opposing 
each other, each supposedly “representing” its respective people and being 
represented on the battlefield by its army, in its turn drawn from the people itself 
and thus somehow representative of it.9 Indeed, it is possible to view the 
relationship between war and the state as almost a symbiosis, where the state is 
built on war, which in turn presupposes the state.10 This form of war was aptly 
described by Clausewitz as “a continuation of politics by other means” i.e. as 
clearly subordinated to politics in an end-means relationship (see Fig. 1).11
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Fig. 1: Clausewitzian War 
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Thirdly, the Clausewitzian paradigm of war presupposed a symbiotic unity of 
peoples, states and armies, which may also soon be a thing of the past. The unity 
between peoples and armies was manifested in the introduction of universal 
(male) conscription in most of Europe in the course of the century following the 
1789 French Revolution—and it was usually accompanied by the granting of 
civil and political rights to the population, tantamount to the forging of a certain 
unity between peoples and states.20  
 
Conscription, however, now seems to be on its way out, at least in the 
industrialised world,21 where professional soldiers are the order of the day. We 
are even witnessing a progressive privatisation of war with the outsourcing of 
combat and other military tasks to private military companies (PMCs)22—a 
phenomenon which we shall also encounter in several African armed conflicts. 
One of the explanations may be that governments no longer feel entitled to 
jeopardise the lives of their citizens in war, i.e. that the world (or at least the 
developed part of it) have entered an era of “post-heroic warfare”.23     
 
“War” in the traditional, i.e. Clausewitzian sense, may thus be approaching 
obsolescence.24 Indeed, for the entire period from 1990 to 2001, only three 
(Iraq/Kuwait, India/Pakistan and Ethiopia/Eritrea) of a total of 57 major armed 
conflicts were between states, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Project.25 
This may be an argument for labelling other forms of armed conflict “wars”, if 
only in order to save the term from oblivion and as a way of acknowledging the 
changing nature of armed conflict. Hence terms such as “new wars” (Mary 
Kaldor) or “uncivil wars” (Donald Snow), “post-trinitarian”, “post-modern” or  
“neo-archaïc wars” (as suggested by the present author on different occasions).26  
On the other hand, it may be preferable to continue to reserve the label “war” to 
the increasingly rare phenomenon of large-scale armed conflict between states—
just as one does not begin calling other animals “rhinos” merely because the 
rhinoceros has become an endangered species. 
 
As this kind of war has all along been rare occurrence in post-independence 
Africa, I shall leave it at that. 
 
Intra-State and Transnational Conflicts 
Most of today’s armed conflicts are intra-state,27 i.e. they take place either 
between different groups within a society or between the state and an insurgent 
group. The contentious issues (“incompatibilities”) have by some analysts been 
lumped together under the headings “government” and “territory”, i.e. as having 
to do with either the type of political system or the incumbent government or 
with territorial issues such as secession or autonomy.28
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As such conflicts are the predominant ones in Africa, most of the following 
account is devoted to such intra-state conflicts. There is, of course, also a wealth 
of conflicts at the intra-personal level, such as wife- battering, rape, child abuse 
or violent crime, but these have largely been omitted from the analysis.  
 
A number of intra-state conflicts have become partly internationalised by the 
involvement of either other states or non-state contestants across an international 
border—for which phenomenon I have opted for the term “transnational 
conflicts”.29 Arguably this transnationalisation of armed conflict is merely a 
reflection of the growing importance of transnational relations of all sorts30—and 
partly caused by globalisation.31 The boundaries between “inside” and “outside” 
may simply be eroding, and the frontiers becoming increasingly blurred.32 
Conflicts which are, by their very nature, intra-state may become 
transnationalised in various ways, including the following: 
 
• Through “humanitarian intervention”33 by external powers, most often those 
of the global West or North, as happened in Somalia and to a limited (and 
rather perverted) sense in Rwanda with the French “Operation Turquoise”. 
• In ethnic conflicts, one or several of the parties to the conflict may have 
ethnic kin in control of state power in neighbouring states. Especially if the 
latter base their legitimacy on ethnic nationalism they may feel compelled to 
come to the assistance of their beleaguered ethnic kin. 
• The relationship between states and ethnic groups may also work the other 
way, as states may wage “proxy wars” against each other by supporting 
armed insurgents on each other’s territory who may or may not be ethnically 
related. 
• Insurgents may operate out of bases across the border, thereby justifying 
cross-border raids, either in hot pursuit of fleeing insurgents (or terrorists) or, 
more radically, in the form of larger incursions or even invasions with the 
goal of destroying the bases—as was arguably the case of the Rwandan 
intervention in the DR Congo.  
 
There are thus many ways in which what began as intra-state conflicts may 
become inter- or transnationalised, either deliberately or inadvertently. Once 
other states become involved they may well behave in a manner resembling 
what they would do in a genuine international conflict, which merely illustrates 
the blurred distinctions between the three levels of armed conflict.   
 
The Regional Level 
Transnational conflicts mainly appear between adjacent states, i.e. at the 
regional level, which might be regarded as a special level bridging the divide 
between the international and the transnational one. However, not only has the 
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regional level generally been disregarded in the international relations (IR) 
literature, but also the definition and delimitation of regions remain 
controversial, both theoretically and politically. 
 
What is clear is that a region is a subset of the global international system, but 
how to delimitate such a subset is debatable because several criteria might be 
applied, each yielding a different result—none of them, of course, being more 
correct than the others.34 Moreover, for analytical (and sometimes also political) 
purposes it may be useful with a further subdivision to the level of sub regions 
or even smaller groupings. For instance, if one treats “Africa” as a region, then 
sub-Saharan Africa is automatically relegated to the status of a sub-region. The 
sum of the Great Lakes countries or those of Southern Africa would then, at 
most, qualify a “sub-sub-regions”, and we would need additional “sub-prefixes” 
to label any subset within them, such as parts of states (provinces, for instance) 
or “regions” which straddle state borders but comprise only parts of these states. 
 
Among the possible criteria for delimitation the first that springs to mind is the 
simple geographical (or geopolitical) one of proximity, as a region is usually 
held to consist of contiguous states. For instance, one would never label the 
Commonwealth a region, simply because it comprises non-contiguous states. 
This contiguity criterion, however, begs the question of where to draw the outer 
limit, unless there happen to be clear natural boundaries. The African continent 
happens to be fairly clearly delimited, the only exceptions being the Egyptian 
Sinai Peninsula outside the continent and the Spanish exclaves in North Africa. 
However, it is far from obvious that countries like Egypt or the rest of the 
Maghreb really belong to Africa rather than to the Middle East—or even a 
Mediterranean region.35 Moreover, in relations between peoples, societies and 
states, proximity is not merely a matter of physical distance, but also a function 
of topography, infrastructure, technology and economic factors. For instance, 
the fastest route of travel between several African capitals happens to be via 
Europe (sic!), simply because intra-African transport networks are so under-
developed, partly as a legacy of colonialism. 
 
Secondly, we have a variation on the geographical criterion, focusing on 
ecosystems, for instance defined by shared rivers and or other sources of water 
supplies.36  In several cases, belonging to such an ecosystem creates a certain 
commonality, at least in the sense of mutual dependency and shared interests—
as well as, alas, the basis for conflicts over how the proper division of “shared” 
natural resources. Arguably, the very term “Great Lakes Region” is based on 
such a criterion—even though the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) would then 
have to be excluded from it, and Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi included. 
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Thirdly, there is the criterion of cultural affinity—which happens to almost 
coincide with that of “civilisations” as used by Samuel Huntington, who predicts 
a clash between some of the world’s (alleged) nine great civilisations.37  Apart 
from this unfortunate coincidence, the criterion may be unwieldy as cultural 
homogeneity is usually more pronounced when seen from the outside (where it 
is viewed as “otherness”) than from the inside.38 Furthermore, “culture” has 
many aspects (e.g. religious, ideological, and ethnic), which do not 
automatically yield the same delimitation. A variation on this theme is the 
notion of regions as “imagined communities”, in analogy with nations as 
understood by Benedict Anderson and other social constructivists. Like nations 
regions may be constituted as such by the members “imagining” themselves as 
belonging together, and the rest of the world acknowledging them as such, 
regardless of whether either has any “objective” foundation.39
 
Fourthly, the latter variation brings us into the sphere of politics, where a 
convenient political or legal criterion of delimitation might be membership of 
institutions or organisations defined as “regional”, e.g. by the United Nations.40 
Unfortunately, however, most African organisations (with the partial exceptions 
of ECOWAS and SADC) are so weak as to appear unsuitable for this purpose—
and large parts of Africa are almost devoid of organisations, as is the case of the 
Great Lakes region. Moreover, there is considerable overlap between regions-
defined-by-organisations (vide infra). 
 
Fifthly, we have the “scientific” or empirical criterion of interaction, according 
to which regions may be identified as such by a greater-than-average intensity of 
interaction. Most analyses have focused on trade and other forms of economic 
interaction, but this would yield rather meagre results in all of Africa because of 
the low level of intra-African trade, at least as far as the formal economy is 
concerned. However, one might also look at phenomena such as labour 
migration and other cross-border human interaction, which might arguably also 
form the basis of regionalisation.41
 
Finally, as a variation of the above, we might define regions as having an above-
average intensity of interaction and interdepence in the specific field of security. 
Barry Buzan has thus suggested the term  “security complex” for “a group of 
states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that 
their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one 
another”.42 For all its merits, however, this concept seems to need some 
modification in order to be analytically useful when applied to Africa. First of 
all, its implications depend on how “security” is defined, more on which below. 
Secondly, the theory will have to allow for an overlap among security 
complexes, i.e. take into due account that some states may have to be reckoned 
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as parts of more than one security complex. While this may make the concept 
less neat, and the theory less parsimonious, it would surely make them both 
more useful tools for dealing with the real world. 
 
However defined, the regional level seems useful as it allows for capturing both 
international and transnational conflict dynamics. Hence, the case studies on 
African countries have been grouped according to region and preceded by 
accounts of their respective regions—or rather sub regions. In order to avoid the 
inconvenience of cumbersome prefixes, whenever there has seemed to be no 
room for misunderstanding, the term “region” has been preferred also for what 
are rightly sub regions or even smaller sets. 
 
The Roots of Conflict 
Conflicts have both structural (“root”) and proximate causes (“triggers”), the 
former referring to the underlying problems and the latter to the triggering 
factors. Fully-fledged conflicts never spring out into the open without a 
combination of the two, i.e. neither can a single event precipitate an open 
conflict unless there are structural reasons for it, nor can structural causes create 
a crisis in the absence of a triggering factor. This has implications for the 
handling of crises, e.g. for early warning and conflict prevention, which is often 
subdivided into “structural” and “operational” prevention, roughly 
corresponding to dealing with structural and proximate causes.43  
 
The treatment of proximate causes has been relegated to the section on the 
conflict cycle, so we shall begin with a look at the potential structural causes of 
conflict. A useful point of departure is the commonplace distinction between 
conflicts of interests and conflicts of values and attitudes.44
 
Conflicts of Interest 
Even though conflicts of interests are, by definition, “objective”, they are not 
immediately observable and their identification may, to a large extent, be a 
matter of ideology. One can arrive at the identification of objective interests 
from several different theoretical or ideological vantage points.  
 
• Marxism thus argues that the ownership of the means of production 
(including land) leads to exploitation of the peasants and workers by the 
owners, which is tantamount to an irreconcilable and antagonistic conflict of 
interests, regardless of whether the two sides are aware of its presence.45 
• The Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung argues that “relative 
deprivation” constitutes “structural violence”, regardless of whether the 
parties realise this.46 This deprivation is likely to produce aggression and, in 
due course, direct violence. This is especially likely to occur in the case of 
“rank disequilibria”, e.g. if groups of people rank high on one scale (e.g. of 
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education), but low on others such as influence.47 
• Another peace researcher, John Burton, basically agree with this explanation 
whilst emphasising the paramount importance of  “basic human needs” 
which are presumably inherent in human nature and universal, hence non-
negotiable—the needs for identity, recognition, security and personal 
development which “will be pursued”, come what may. 48 
 
While all three theories posit an objective antagonism between the “haves” and 
the “have-nots”, it is important to stress that it is not absolute (material and 
other) poverty, which causes conflict behaviour. There is no strong correlation, 
if any, between violent behaviour and living standards. It is relative poverty or 
deprivation that causes grievances and conflict behaviour, i.e. a standard of 
living which is seen as unsatisfactory in comparison with something else—either 
with that which others (are seen to) enjoy, or with what the individual or group 
in question used to enjoy, or what s/he expected to enjoy in the future. Hence, 
deteriorating living conditions may cause conflicts, as may even a declining rate 
of growth, because it may frustrate overly optimistic expectations, thereby 
producing aggression and a propensity for direct violence, as implied by the 
famous “frustration-aggression hypothesis”.49  
 
For all the merits of the above hypotheses, they are hard to operationalise. To 
the extent that  “objective” conflicts of interests are not acknowledged by the 
parties (who may not even be conscious of their conflicting interests) the analyst 
has to resort to notions of  “false consciousness”.50 Thereby he makes himself an 
easy target for critics charging him with not being “scientific” because the 
postulates are inherently unfalsifiable.51
 
Indeed the analyst may even be charged with “cultural imperialism”, say if he 
(or, even more likely, she) claims that women are oppressed (i.e. suffer a 
relative deprivation of rights) and therefore have an objective interest in equal 
rights, if this claim is made in countries where gender stereotypes are so 
internalised in both sexes that women willingly accept a subordinate position in 
society—or even atrocities such as female circumcision (better labelled “genital 
mutilation”). However, such cases should not be taken as arguments against 
assuming objective interests, as it is surely not in the objective interest of babies 
to be mutilated. For all its possible merits, cultural relativism can surely be taken 
too far. 
 
Even though a causal link between relative deprivation and violence may be 
difficult to demonstrate, there certainly seems to be a significant correlation 
between the two. First of all most major armed conflicts take place in the Third 
World—and not least in Africa as set out in Table 2.  
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Table 2: Armed Conflicts by Region52
 Europe Middle 
East 
Asia Americas Africa 
1989 2 4 19 8 14 
1990 3 6 18 5 17 
1991 6 7 16 5 17 
1992 9 7 20 4 15 
1993 10 7 15 3 11 
1994 5 5 15 4 13 
1995 5 4 13 4 9 
1996 1 5 14 2 14 
1997 0 3 15 2 14 
1998 2 3 15 2 15 
1999 3 2 14 2 16 
2000 1 3 14 1 14 
 
Secondly, the general picture of relative deprivation of most of the “Third 
World” is fairly clear and indisputable. It was aptly summed up in the opening 
words of the United Nations’ 2001 Report on the World Social Situation: 
“Disparities in income and wealth are growing in many countries, and the 
distance between richer and poorer countries is also widening.”53
 
The annual reports of the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) 
present a very similar picture of a growing gap between the haves and the have-
nots, both within and between countries and with regard to all indicators of 
“human development”. According to the 2002 issue of the Human Development 
Report, the richest five percent of the world’s people have incomes 114 times 
those of the poorest five percent,54 and the average per capita income was 
US$27,848 in the high-income OECD countries as compared to 1,690 in sub-
Saharan Africa, i.e. sixteen times higher. 
 
This inequality is not “merely” a question of income, but is also reflected in, for 
instance, life expectancy where that of the rich countries is 78.2 years, but that 
of Africa south of the Sahara is a mere 48.7.55 Table 3 lists the “top twenty” and 
“bottom twenty” countries on the “human development index” (HDI) calculated 
by the UNDP, which also measures such factors as education (adult literacy and 
enrollment in primary, secondary and tertiary education) in addition to GDP pc, 
i.e. gross domestic product per capita. 
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Table 3: Human Development: Selected Indicators56
Rank Top 20 Life Exp. GDP pc HDI Rank Bottom 20 Life Exp. GDP pc HDI
1 Norway 78.5 29,918 0.942 154 Senegal 53.3 1,510 0.431
2 Sweden 79.7 24,277 0.941 155 DRC 51.3 765 0.431
3 Canada 78.8 27,840 0.940 156 Côte d ’Ivoire 47.8 1630 0.428
4 Belgium 78.4 27,178 0.939 157 Eritrea 52 837 0.421
5 Australia 78.9 25,693 0.939 158 Benin 53.8 990 0.420
6 United States 77.0 34,142 0.939 159 Guinea 47.5 1982 0.414
7 Iceland 79.2 29,581 0.936 160 Gambia 46.2 1649 0.405
8 Netherlands 78.1 25,657 0.935 161 Angola 45.2 2,187 0.403
9 Japan 81.0 26,755 0.933 162 Rwanda 40.2 943 0.403
10 Finland 77.6 24,996 0.930 163 Malawi 40 615 0.400
11 Switzerland 78.9 28,769 0.928 164 Mali 51.5 797 0.386
12 France 78.6 24,223 0.928 165 CAS 44.3 1172 0.375
13 UK 77.7 23,509 0.928 166 Chad 45.7 871 0.365
14 Denmark 76.2 27,627 0.926 167 Guinea-Bissau 44.8 755 0.349
15 Austria 78.1 26,765 0.926 168 Ethiopia 43.9 668 0.327
16 Luxembourg 77.4 50,061 0.925 169 Burkina Faso 46.7 976 0.325
17 Germany 77.7 25,103 0.925 170 Mozambique 39.3 854 0.322
18 Ireland 76.6 29,866 0.925 171 Burundi 40.6 591 0.313
19 New Zealand 77.6 20,070 0.917 172 Niger 45.2 746 0.277
20 Italy 78.5 23,626 0.913 173 Sierra Leone 38.9 490 0.275
 
Life in the Third World is thus indeed “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short”,57 but especially so for the unfortunate poor, whereas the wealthy part of 
the population tends to be quite well off, even by European standards. 
 
Inequalities within developing countries are thus usually much more dramatic 
than in the typical OECD countries, as emerges clearly from Table 4. In 
countries such as Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone, the richest ten percent of the 
population thus have more than eighty times as much wealth at their disposal as 
the poorest ten percent. In comparison, the distribution in the “egalitarian” 
Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland) is much more even, 
the richest ten percent having only 5-6 times as much as the poorest ten 
percent—and even the much less egalitarian United States has a more even 
income distribution, especially when measured in “20/20” figures comparing the 
richest to the poorest twenty percent of the population.   
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Table 4: Inequalities within 
Countries58 Share of Income or Consumption Inequality 
HDI   Poorest Richest Richest/Poorest
Ran
k Country Year 10% 20% 20% 10% 10:10 20:20
154 Senegal 1995 2.6 6.4 48.2 33.5 12.9 7.5
156 Côte d ’Ivoire 1995 3.0 7.1 44.2 28.8 9.6 6.2
159 Guinea 1994 2.6 6.4 47.2 32.0 12.3 7.4
160 Gambia 1994 1.6 4.0 55.2 38.2 23.9 13.8
162 Rwanda 1983-85 4.2 9.7 39.1 24.2 5.8 4.0
164 Mali 1994 1.8 4.6 56.2 40.4 22.4 12.2
165 CAS 1993 0.7 2.0 65.0 47.7 68.1 32.5
167 Guinea-Bissau 1991 0.5 2.1 58.9 42.4 84.8 28.0
168 Ethiopia 1995 3.0 7.1 47.7 33.7 11.2 6.7
169 Burkina Faso 1998 2.0 4.6 60.4 46.8 23.4 13.1
170 Mozambique 1996-97 2.5 6.5 46.5 31.7 12.7 7.2
171 Burundi 1998 1.8 5.1 48.0 32.9 18.3 9.4
172 Niger 1995 0.8 2.6 53.3 35.4 44.3 20.5
173 Sierra Leone 1989 0.5 1.1 63.4 43.6 87.2 57.6
1 Norway 1995 4.1 9.7 35.8 21.8 5.3 3.7
2 Sweden 1992 3.7 9.6 34.5 20.1 5.4 3.6
3 Canada 1994 2.8 7.5 39.3 23.8 8.5 5.2
4 Belgium 1996 3.2 8.3 37.3 23.0 7.2 4.5
5 Australia 1994 2.0 5.9 41.3 25.4 12.7 7.0
6 United States 1997 1.8 5.2 46.4 30.5 16.9 8.9
8 Netherlands 1994 2.8 7.2 40.1 25.1 9.0 5.6
9 Japan 1993 4.8 10.6 35.6 21.7 4.5 3.4
10 Finland 1991 4.2 10.0 35.8 21.6 5.1 3.6
11 Switzerland 1992 2.6 6.9 40.3 25.2 9.7 5.8
12 France 1995 2.8 7.2 40.2 25.1 9.0 5.6
13 United Kingdom 1995 2.2 6.1 43.2 27.7 12.6 7.1
14 Denmark 1992 3.6 9.6 34.5 20.5 5.7 3.6
15 Austria 1995 2.5 6.9 38.0 22.5 9.0 5.5
16 Luxembourg 1994 4.0 9.4 36.5 22.0 5.5 3.9
17 Germany 1994 3.3 8.2 38.5 23.7 7.2 4.7
18 Ireland 1987 2.5 6.7 42.9 27.4 11.0 6.4
20 Italy 1995 3.5 8.7 36.3 21.8 6.2 4.2
 
Globalisation may further exacerbate these problems, not only because it tends 
to objectively widen the gap between the haves and the have-nots, within and 
between countries, but also because it makes the gap more obvious to the have-
nots, inter alia because of the growing access of everybody to the media.59 
American soap operas portraying “the filthy rich” must appear even more absurd 
when viewed in a village in Mozambique by people struggling hard to stave off 
starvation than when watched by, say, Danish youngsters, who are both much 
better off and in a better position to know that the spectacle is not even 
representative of the United States. 
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Conflicts of Values 
Conflicts of values and attitudes relate to less tangible and material matters than 
those of interests, but they are, paradoxically, more immediately observable, 
simply because values, beliefs and attitudes are, by their very nature, held 
consciously. 
 
While it is, in principle, possible to have conflicts over any value or issue,60 
certain factors are more likely to become rallying points in conflicts than others, 
first among which seem to be ethnicity (including race), nationalism and 
religion.  
 
Ethnicity does, of course, often rest on “objective” features such as race or other 
physical or linguistic features, as highlighted by ethnicity analysts of the 
“objectivist” or “primordialist” persuasion, who see ethnicity as an objective 
fact.61 In their view ethnic identification may be subdued (as it was in Eastern 
Europe under Soviet/Communist rule) but once the “lid” is off, it will spring out 
into the open, simply because it is “natural”.  A more cultural, but still 
“objectivist” definition is that of Anthony Smith, who defines an ethnic group as 
“a named culture-community whose members have a myth of common origins, 
shared memories and cultural characteristics, a link with a homeland and a 
measure of solidarity.”62
 
Closer analysis, however, reveals ethnicity to be a social construction, as 
objective features sometimes, but not always, become points of identification. 
Moreover, for most objective yardsticks there are sliding scales and grey areas, 
e.g. between different dialects and separate languages. It is only when the 
feature in question becomes a matter of social identification (or discrimination) 
that the need for clear-cut definitions emerges.63  A perverse example of this was 
the “pencil test” used by the security forces of the apartheid regime in South 
Africa. When there was doubt whether a person should classify as white (or 
Asian) or black, the police officers inserted a pencil into his/her hair. If it fell to 
the floor the person was accepted as white (with all the accompanying rights), 
but if it stuck in the hair s/he was relegated to the disenfranchised and 
discriminated group of blacks. 
 
Ethnies are thus, just as nations, best conceived of as “imagined communities,” 
and social constructs—but none the less real for that, as socially constructed 
reality is a reality on par with physical reality, only of a different kind.64 
However, social construction also allows ethnicity to be instrumentalised and 
abused, usually in the form of xenophobia or overt racism, by political leaders in 
pursuit of private goals such as power or profits.65 That the consequences thereof 
can be severe or even disastrous has recently been demonstrated in the former 
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Yugoslavia66 as well as, even more dramatically, by the Rwandan genocide in 
1994. 
 
Religion also often plays a divisive role, either as a constituent element of 
ethnicity or as an independent issue of contention,67 as illustrated by some of the 
conflicts in Nigeria.68 A clash between Islam and the West, either in the form of 
state-versus-state encounters or of the “war” between the Al-Qaeda network and 
the United States, also illustrates the potential of religion to become a rallying 
point for conflict.69 On the other hand, shared religious affiliations and/or strong 
ecumenical traditions can also by conducive to conflict prevention or resolution 
(as in South Africa).70
 
Non-religious ideologies may play the same divisive role.71 Just as many 
political conflicts within countries are driven by ideology, the entire East-West 
conflict was arguably a conflict pitting proponents of one set of values 
(communism) against the advocates of capitalism (market economy) and 
democracy.  Whether it is over with the end of the Cold War, as proclaimed by 
Francis Fukuyama, remains to be seen.72  
 
The Political Sphere 
Political conflicts do not constitute a separate category of conflicts alongside 
those over interests and values. Rather, the political sphere is the arena where 
most conflicts are fought out, one way or the other, as this is where the 
“authoritative allocation of values for a society” takes place, as argued by David 
Easton73—be they material values as in conflicts of interests and immaterial 
ones, as in conflicts of values. 
 
Centrality of the State 
The main institution in the political system of today is the state. It may well be 
that this has not always been the case, but that other forms of political 
organisations have predominated at other times.74 It may also well be the case 
that the state is a European invention which has subsequently been 
superimposed upon other forms of authority, e.g. in Africa.75  
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Fig. 2: Elements of Statehood 
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Quite a strong case can also be made to the effect that the state is far from an 
ideal instrument for allocating values for a society, especially not when this 
“society” is becoming increasingly globalised and partly borderless—hence the 
likely need for other forms of governance in the not so distant future.76 As of 
today, however, the state is the cornerstone of politics, both within bordered 
societies and between such societies, as the international system remains 
predominantly a state system.77  
 
This makes it all the more deplorable that many states in the Third World, and 
not least in Africa, are weak and deficient in several respects. A useful 
conceptualisation of the “dimensions” of statehood, capable of capturing both 
state strengths and weaknesses, is that developed by Barry Buzan and 
subsequently slightly amended by Kalevi Holsti.78 They both distinguish 
between the idea, the physical basis and the institutions of the state, while 
acknowledging that the three are closely interlinked (see Fig. 2). 
 
The Idea of the State 
The “idea” of the state signifies its purpose or raison d’être, for which role 
several sets of ideas may recommend themselves. 
 
• The simplest is that of historical continuity, i.e. the notion that a state has 
been there since times immemorial, or at least for a long period. This 
provides it with a degree of legitimacy, even in such cases where a state has 
temporarily ceased to be (as has, for instance, been the case of Poland more 
than once). This idea of continuity may also be more specific, e.g. by being 
linked to dynastic succession or to borders. It is often underpinned by myths, 
e.g. about heroic battles such as the Serbian myth (containing grains of truth) 
about the heroic battle against the Turks at Kosovo Polje.  
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• With thinkers such as Locke and Rousseau (or even Hobbes) came notions 
about a social contract between rulers and subjects, i.e. the concept of 
popular sovereignty according to which the state should somehow represent 
the people79—either in the form of democracy or (in a more perverted form) 
through the rule by a “vanguard” of the people, as in Marxism-Leninism or 
National Socialism. 
• The latter points to the possibility of ideologically defined states, such as the 
“Democratic Peoples Republic” of Korea (DPRK, i.e. North Korea), the very 
raison d’être of which is to be based on the socialist “juche” ideology, 
alleged to further the objective interests of the people.80 In a similar vein, 
certain states have a religious foundation, as the Jewish state of Israel or the 
Islamic states of Pakistan or Iran.81  
• The most common modern idea of the state is, however, that of constituting 
the political “superstructure” of a society, conceived of as a nation, which 
raises the question how state and nation may be combined.  
 
It is certainly possible that the state may precede the nation and serve as its 
constitutive criterion, as in political “state-nations” such as Frace and the United 
States where the nation is conceived of as simply the sum of the citizens.82 In 
other cases, however, the nation precedes the state, and the predominant norm is 
that the state should conform as closely to the nation as possible, i.e. that the 
entire nation should belong to the nation-state, which should further be 
homogenous in the sense of containing no other nations or parts thereof. This 
has been the typically German form of nationalism.83
 
Fig 3: Linkage State-Nation  
 
Nation-State                  Multinational State    Part-Nation State 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: Nation: Rounded shapes, State: Rectangular or sextangular shapes.   
 
The nation-state is, however, a rather rare exception to the general rule that the 
borders of nations and states do not match (See Fig. 3). Many states are thus 
multi-national in the sense of comprising several nations within the same state 
borders, and some are part-nation-states, containing only part of a nation, as was 
the case of the German states through most of their history, and which remains 
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the case of the two Koreas and other “divided states”.84 As we shall see in 
chapter six, Somalia belongs in this category of divided states, whereas Ethiopia 
is an almost textbook example of a multinational empire. Finally, there are 
several possible combinations of the two (i.e. multinational part-nations), as in 
the former Yugoslavia, which comprised, among other “entrapped” nations, a 
sizable segment of the Albanian nation, in its turn scattered across Macedonia 
and other states as well as concentrated in Albania proper.85  
 
The Physical Basis of the State 
Every state needs a physical basis, including a territory, a population and an 
economic foundation. 
 
• Territory. However much one might speculate about future “virtual states”, 
actual states need a territory, defining the limits of their sovereign domain. 
To which extent there are perennial laws and regularities for the size and 
configuration of this territory is a matter for geopoliticians to theorise about.86 
Suffice it to say that it has to be “adequate” and manageable, but often is 
not—especially in the case of former colonies whose borders were drawn by 
external powers with little regard for the “facts on the ground”. As a 
consequence, many Third World states, not least in Africa, are endowed with 
awkward shapes as, for instance, Namibia (with the Caprivi Strip); or they 
include exclaves such as Cabinda, belonging to, but geographically separated 
from, Angola; or they are ungovernably large (as the DR Congo), while 
others are unsustainably small (as Lesotho or Swaziland); or landlocked 
without access to the sea, as are several African states. Moreover, borders 
between states frequently collide with the actual borders of the second 
element of the physical basis, i.e. the population.    
• Population. Every state needs a population, but there are no rules as to its 
size, which varies, with several orders of magnitude, ranging from the Holy 
See (Vatican State) with a population of a mere 890 souls to China with 
nearly 1.3 billion inhabitants.87 An important parameter is that of ethnic, 
religious, cultural and linguistic homogeneity, as many (but not all) states 
with heterogeneous populations exhibit a lack of internal cohesion, often 
manifested in civil strife.88 Often, but again not always, such conflicts give 
rise to claims for autonomy or even secession,89 of which we shall encounter 
several instances in the following chapters. 
• Economic basis: A state further needs an economic basis (which may, of 
course, be subsumed under population and territory). While Marxism is 
surely wrong in assuming that the state is merely a superstructure of the 
economy,90 it is undoubtedly right in assuming that the economy matters, if 
only because a productive surplus is a necessary (albeit not a sufficient) 
precondition of running the state apparatus. Without such an economic 
surplus, and the capacity to extract it via taxation, the state is in dire straits.   
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The State Institutions 
This takes us the “the state as such”, i.e. the institutions of which it consists. 
Important parameters are the form of government and its legitimacy, the 
administrative capacity and the relationship between the armed forces and the 
state. 
 
• Form of government. While dynastic succession was previously regarded 
as sufficient for what has been called the “procedural legitimacy” of a 
government, today’s standards call for democratic rule, i.e. for free and fair 
elections with the participation of multiple parties, a free press, etc. 
Unfortunately, a functioning and stable democracy is usually the product of 
a long period of trial-and-error. Lacking such long democratic traditions, 
most African and other Third World states are therefore far from the ideal of 
democracy, and more aptly labelled “democratising countries”.91 Even when 
the form of government is formally democratic, the political system may still 
be patrimonial or neopatrimonial, implying that governance is based on 
personal ties and various forms of patron-client relations.92 The leader 
receives the support from his subordinates and subjects in return for various 
“favours” (e.g. in the form of jobs or protection), a system which often 
works at all levels of political authority—with Mobuto’s Zaïre as the most 
infamous example.93 However, such (neo)patrimonial rule is vulnerable to 
any economic downturn which may jeopardise the “trickling down” of 
favours and resources through the system. The state should further conform 
to the Weberian view of a “rational-legal polity” (as opposed to a 
“traditional” or a “charismatic” one),94 and it should enjoy a “monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force”95 with a clear division of labour among the 
various state agencies, combined with a clear (hierarchical) distribution of 
powers and responsibilities—all of which are rare exceptions, rather than the 
rule, in Africa and the rest of the developing world. 
• Administrative capacity may contribute (alongside neopatrimonialism) to 
providing even non-democratic governments with a degree of “performance 
legitimacy”, which may arguably serve as a partial substitute for a deficient 
or completely lacking procedural legitimacy.96 If an incumbent government 
can ensure law and order, degrees of freedom and perhaps even perform 
various “welfare functions”, its claim to power may not actually be 
questioned by the majority of the population—especially in countries without 
any tradition of democracy. Unfortunately, however, most Third World states 
also score low with regard to performance, if only because their services are 
usually performed by a bureaucracy which is not at all imbued with a 
“Weberian” ethos of service, but rather infected by corruption.97 
• Civil-military relations. Ideally the armed forces and the rest of the 
”security sector” should also conform to the Weberian ideal, accept civilian 
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supremacy and abstain from any interference in politics. “Objective control”, 
according to Samuel Huntington should ensure “that distribution of political 
power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the 
emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the 
officers corps”, and which would allow them to perform well as “the tool of 
the state”, where “a highly professional officers corps stands ready to carry 
out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority 
within the state”.98 However, in many weak states around the Third World, 
the danger of “praetorianism” looms large,99 as the armed forces seek to 
control the state as such, e.g. via actual or threatened military coups.100 They 
may do so either in order to protect their specific institutional or even 
personal interests (as typically in Latin America or West Africa)101 or in a 
(usually misguided) attempt at “saving the nation from itself”, as may be the 
case of, for instance, Turkey and Pakistan.102 Proper labels might be 
“predatory” and “patriotic praetorians”, respectively. Alternatively, the state 
and the military may develop a malign form of symbiosis, where the entire 
state (or even society as a whole) becomes thoroughly militarised—as was 
the case of the former USSR and South Africa and remains the case of, e.g., 
Israel and China even today.103 
 
Weak and Failed States 
The above elements of statehood are interrelated, which means that weakness in 
one respect can easily produce other weaknesses and generate vicious circles of 
conflict, further weakening the State. The weakness (or “softness”, as Gunnar 
Myrdal called it) of many states, mostly but not exclusively in the Third World, 
is due to several factors, including the colonial past and the very short period in 
which to build a state in comparison with the centuries available for European 
state-building.104
 
While state weakness is thus endemic to the Third World, and not least Africa, 
only some states have ended up in the category of “failed states”, also referred to 
as “collapsed” or “quasi-states”.105 Examples of failed states are Somalia and 
Afghanistan, which have, for protracted periods, been stateless to all practical 
intents and purposes.106 Others states are better labelled “quasi-states”,107 as the 
state remains as an almost empty shell endowed with “formal sovereignty” (also 
known as “external” or “negative sovereignty”) which is, however, 
unaccompanied by any “empirical sovereignty”. Such a state is recognised by 
other states as sovereign, and thus protected by the norm of non-interference in 
internal affairs, but it has no actual control (“internal” or “positive sovereignty”) 
over what happens within its sovereign domain.108 Most states have, however, 
managed to “muddle through” from crisis to crisis without any actual collapse.109  
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Security and Conflict 
Most of the conflicts in the political sphere as well as many others revolve 
around “security” in one sense or the other, i.e. they are driven by the security 
concerns of one actor, or both. Hence, a lasting resolution to any given conflict 
tends to presuppose that both or all sides to it are, or at least feel, secure. 
 
We thus need to devote some attention to the very concept “security”, which has 
indeed become the subject of numerous analyses over the last decade or so.110 
The general trend has been a move away from a rather narrow, state-centric and 
militarised conception (“national security”), via one focusing on national and 
other identities (“societal security”), to a much wider concept which includes 
concerns for human rights, development, gender issues, etc., labelled “human 
security”. The latter may, indeed, be much more relevant for Africa than the 
narrower conceptions. 
 
Security and Securitisation  
In International Relations (IR), the term “security” was used, until recently, in a 
rather narrow sense, i.e. as almost synonymous with military power, and it was 
assumed that it was mainly a function of the distribution of this military power. 
The more favourable the military balance was to a state, the more secure is was 
assumed to be. 
 
Surprisingly little was, however, written about the concept of security (as 
opposed to strategies for achieving it) by the IR theoreticians. In his seminal 
work on Realism, the grand old man of Realism, Hans Morgenthau, thus hardly 
bothered to define “security”.111 Arnold Wolfers was thus almost alone in 
venturing a definition, which has gradually become standard: “Security, in an 
objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a 
subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.”112  
However, even this definition begs a number of questions: Whose values might 
be threatened and which are they?  Who or what might threaten them and how? 
Whose fears should count and how might one distinguish between sincere and 
faked ones? And should the “absence” of threats and/or fear be understood in 
absolute or relative terms?  
 
In contrast to IR, peace researchers have for decades endeavoured to develop 
meaningful conceptions of security as well as (closely related) of peace and 
violence.113 This preoccupation has also reflected their longstanding interest in 
development issues114 and the generally shared wish to avoid the pitfalls of the 
ethnocentrism, which has arguably always characterised IR.115 Both Johan 
Galtung’s term “positive peace” and Kenneth Boulding’s “stable peace” might 
thus, in retrospect, be seen as precursors of the emerging, expanded security 
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concept.116 For “security” to be genuine and durable, it would have to be based 
on a positive or stable peace structure. This would entail considerably more than 
a mere “negative peace”, tantamount to an absence of war, in its turn 
representing merely one particular form of “direct violence”. Genuine peace and 
security would thus presuppose an elimination (or at least a reduction) of 
“structural violence”, i.e. the relative deprivation of large parts of the world 
population (vide supra). Thus conceived, a “positive peace” was more or less 
synonymous with what is today referred to as “human security” (vide infra).  
 
Since the 1990s many members of the IR community have accepted the 
challenge of developing broader conceptions of security.117 Barry Buzan and his 
collaborators at the now disbanded Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 
COPRI (sometimes referred to as the “Copenhagen School”) have belonged to 
the theoretical vanguard in this endeavour with their analyses of national as well 
as “societal” security (vide infra).118 However, while acknowledging the need for 
shifting the focus from the (now defunct) East-West conflict and military 
matters,119 most members of the IR and “strategic studies” (now often re-labelled 
“security studies”) communities have continued to oppose what they regard as 
an inappropriate expansion of the concept. 
 
Even though a consensus thus seems to be emerging on the need for a certain 
widening, disagreement persists about where to draw the line. To expand the 
notion of security excessively—say, to include the absence of all types of 
problems and conflicts at all levels—would not be practical, since it would 
merely create the need for an additional term for “traditional security”, now 
relegated to being merely one species of the genus “security”. Not to widen the 
concept at all, on the other hand, might relegate security studies to a very 
marginalized position, if (as seems likely) “traditional” security problems will 
be perceived as having a sharply diminishing saliency. 
 
The quest for a “correct” definition of an “essentially contested concept”120 such 
as “security” is probably futile. Rather, this is a matter of definitions which may 
be more or less useful or relevant, and which may both reflect and impact on 
power relations, but which can be neither right nor wrong. “Constructivists” are 
thus probably right in dismissing the quest for concepts that are “correct” in the 
sense of corresponding to a pre-existing reality, if only because this “reality” is 
itself socially constructed, inter alia by means of concepts such as “peace” and 
“security”. 
 
Mindful of being part of the game himself all the analyst can do may be to 
analyse how concepts are used, and how the security discourse is thus 
evolving.121 As argued by Ole Wæver and others the challenge is thus to analyse 
the security discourse as a complex set of “speech acts”, i.e. to explore the 
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evolving “securitisation” and “desecuritisation” of issues.122 Among other 
advantages, this approach induces caution with regard to elevating too many 
problems to the exalted status of “security problems”, which inevitably has 
political implications, some of which may be undesirable. 
 
First of all, in the political discourse to label something a security problem may 
be (ab)used by the powers that be for making certain issues “taboo” and for 
marginalising their ideological opponents. A matter with alleged (national) 
security implications is arguably “off limits”, i.e. not a totally legitimate subject 
for political or academic debate, but one where everybody has to show loyalty to 
the common cause. In order to prevent such a closure of important debates, a 
relevant political goal might be a “desecuritisation” of pertinent issues, which 
may allow for a more open and fruitful debate. For instance, Russia is no longer 
seen as a security problem for the West, which allows for a more constructive 
and unbiased weighing of alternative options for how to relate to it.  
 
Secondly, certain strata in society may benefit from securitisation, e.g. because 
they are traditionally viewed (and view themselves) as responsible for 
“security”, however defined. To securitise various problems may thus provide 
the security services with a justification for their claim to national resources, 
which may not be desirable.123 “Critical security studies” devote themselves, 
inter alia, to uncovering such interests and power games influencing the security 
discourse.124
 
On the other hand, what might speak in favour of proclaiming something a 
security problem is that this attaches a label of urgency to the issue. Hence the 
attraction of, for instance, securitising environmental problems, which is 
tantamount to imbuing them with “existential” importance. Unless solved 
without delay such a problem may destroy all other values, which warrants 
giving it absolute first priority. The same argument might be made about 
HIV/AIDS.125 
 
Whether to expand the concept of security or not, and if so in which direction 
and to what extent, are thus matters both of political choice and analytical 
convenience. In the following I shall analyse how it might be expanded whilst 
paying some attention to both the positive and negative political implications 
thereof. In principle, expansion can take place along different “axes”, i.e. as 
answers to various questions, which may be subdivided according to how 
radically they depart from the prevailing orthodoxy (See Table 5). 
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Table 5: Expanded Concepts of “Security” 
Degree  Label Referent 
Object 
Value at risk Source(s) of 
threat 
No expan- 
sion 
National 
Security 
The state Sovereignty 
Territorial integrity 
Other states 
(Substate actors)
Incremental  Societal 
security 
Nations 
Societal groups 
National unity 
Identity 
LabelMigrants 
Alien culture
Radical Human 
security 
Individuals 
Mankind 
Survival 
Quality of life 
The State 
Globalization
 
• Security of whom? This is the question of focus, i.e. of the appropriate 
“referent object” (in the terminology of Buzan & al., whereas Bill 
McSweeney prefers the term “subject”).126 Three types of entities 
immediately spring to mind which might be either secure or insecure: the 
state, other human collectives or the individual, more about which shortly. 
• Security of what? Depending on what the referent object is, its security will 
be a matter of an absence of threats to different values, i.e. it may have 
completely different connotations.  
• Security from whom or what? This is the question of the sources of threat. 
Different values may obviously be placed in jeopardy by different actors, in 
addition to which there may be numerous “structural” threats (global 
warming, for example) without any direct agents. These might, in principle, 
also be securitised even though they rarely are. 
 
Depending on which values are supposed to be threatened by whom or what 
threats may, furthermore, appear in different dimensions (or “sectors”), such as 
the military domain, the environment, or the economy—a matter which I shall 
leave largely untouched. 
 
From National to Societal Security 
Most of the “traditional ”security discourse continues to revolve around the 
state, but even here it makes sense to distinguish between orthodox security 
studies and “alternative security studies”. What characterized the traditional IR 
approach to “security”, especially during the era of almost unchallenged 
dominance of Realism and Neorealism,127 was a focus on the state as the referent 
object. Even though the preferred term was “national” security, this was strictly 
speaking a misnomer, because nations are not the same as states, except in a 
score or so of genuine nation-states (Japan, for instance) where nation and state 
happen to be (almost) coterminous (vide supra).  
 
While most “Realists” have placed the main emphasis on military threats from 
other states, hence also on military strength as the most reliable safeguard of 
“national security”, a few authors have held a somewhat broader view of 
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national security, e.g. by including the economic dimension of security—if only 
as a consequence of their acknowledgement that power is, among other things, 
determined by economic strength.128
 
National (i.e. state) security was, moreover, all too often equated with the 
security of the regime in power. Contrary to the Hobbesian view of the state, 
however, if controlled by an unscrupulous regime the state often ceases to be a 
protector of its citizens and becomes a security threat to them, as in the case of 
various African “vampire states”129 or totalitarian regimes. However, the rules of 
the game of “Westphalia” privilege existing states, regardless of their nature, 
and proscribe interference into “domestic affairs”, i.e. everything taking place 
within the territorially defined exclusive domain of the sovereign states 
comprising the system. 
 
The Copenhagen School mentioned above has advocated accepting human 
collectivities as possible “referent objects” of security alongside states. The 
particular form of security applicable to such collective, yet non-state, referent 
objects is labelled “societal security”, which in the seminal work on the topic 
was defined by Ole Wæver as 
 
... the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and 
possible or actual threats (...) the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of 
traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and 
custom.130
 
Societal security is thus a matter of “identity”, which has indeed become quite a 
fashionable topic in IR theory.131 It resonates quite well with the re-discovery of 
the cultural aspects of international relations (as in the “clash of civilizations” 
debate),132 just as it corresponds to the actual “securitisation” of such phenomena 
as migration or “cultural imperialism”. 
 
Unfortunately, it also holds to potential of appealing to xenophobic political 
groupings on the extreme right with whom the authors surely do not want to join 
ranks. Combined with the aforementioned methodology of discourse analysis 
and the post-modern rejection of “objectivist ethics”,133 one might fear that the 
theory (however inadvertently) may simply lead to “rubber-stamping” all 
assertions of threats to national (or ethnic) security as equally valid. If there are 
no objective yardsticks against which to measure such allegations, the analyst is 
confined to merely recording what is being securitised, perhaps by opportunistic 
leaders seeking power by playing the “nationalist card” in a manipulatory 
fashion.134  
 
This was part of the critique raised by Bill McSweeney against the Copenhagen 
School. Another part of his critique was the continuing focus of the state, albeit 
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no longer as the sole referent object, but as the mechanism through which all 
securitisation attempts have to pass. Finally, the “school” (if so it is) was 
criticized for privileging some possible identities over others, namely national 
and ethnic ones. Rather than assuming a priori that these are always the most 
salient identities, the analyst should adopt a scientific approach, requiring actual 
sociological investigations into how people rank-order their various identities.135
 
Even though “societal security” as a concept supposedly applies to any human 
collective, it has almost exclusively focused on national and ethnic collectives 
(viz. McSweeney’s above-mentioned critique). Important though these certainly 
are, one might also envision cleavages among other societal groupings, which 
might eventually come to be securitised. A first step in this direction would 
surely be political organization. Most likely seem to be a possible (societal) 
securitisation of religion or gender. 
 
Religion has already been extensively politicised, if only because of its close 
links to some forms of nationalism (vide supra).136 A few nations are thus 
defined in religious terms, which entails the risk that “alien” religions may come 
to be viewed as threats to national cohesion, hence securitised. To the extent that 
nations or states are not defined in religious terms, but as secular, the politisation 
of any religion (even the “national” one) may likewise come to be seen as threat, 
even to national security—as in modern-day Turkey or India, or in certain Arab 
states where radical Islamist movements threaten already Muslim states.137 Even 
in the case of stable and cohesive states such as those of the West we see this 
phenomenon, as in the growing securitisation of Islam by the West, not merely 
in the shape of allegations to the effect that Islamic states constitute a threat to 
peace, but also with a societal security twist, arguing that Islam (personified by 
migrants) is a threat to Western civilization.138   
 
Gender might, in principle also be securitised, as indicated by various strains of 
“feminist IR studies”, the gist of which seems to be that the traditional focus on 
the state reflects male domination, and that the concurrent emphasis on military 
means corresponds to innate male aggression, hence that an empowerment of 
women would produce more genuine and lasting security.139 Both these topics 
also have obvious human security aspects, if only because they are regulated in 
several human rights conventions. 
  
Human Security 
Just as societal security may thus endanger individual security, the state-centred 
approach to security has been charged with neglecting the people, i.e. of 
jeopardising human security. This is basically a matter of human well-being and, 
in the last analysis, survival of people, regardless of their national or other 
affiliations.140
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“Human security” has, indeed, become something of a buzzword, used both by 
UN agencies, national development aid agencies and international as well as 
national NGO. The UNDP has been in the forefront of the this debate, as 
illustrated by the following quotations:  
 
The concept of security must change-from an exclusive stress on national security to a much 
greater stress on people’s security, from security through armaments to security through 
human development, from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security 
(Human Development Report 1993)141
For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than 
from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, 
environmental security, security from crime-these are the emerging concerns of human 
security all over the world. (..) 
Human security is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and in poor. The threats to 
their security may differ—hunger and disease in poor nations and drugs and crime in rich 
nations-but these threats are real and growing. (...)  
Most people instinctively understand what security means. It means safety from the constant 
threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression. It also means protection from sudden and 
hurtful disruptions in the pattern of our daily lives-whether in our homes, in our jobs, in our 
communities or in our environment (Human Development Report 1994).142
 
Thus conceived human security may indeed be placed in jeopardy by an 
unrestrained quest for national security, say if the latter should involve war. 
Hence, for instance, the uncomfortable dilemma whether to place the survival of 
the population at risk for the sake of such intangible values as sovereignty—or 
whether a developing state should invest heavily in the implements of state 
security (i.e. armed forces) at the inevitable expense of economic 
development?143
 
According to a “cosmopolitan” ethics,144 what really matters is the survival and 
well being of the individuals or, as the utilitarians formulated it, “the greatest 
happiness principle”.145 Such happiness is, of course, compatible with, but only 
rarely presupposes, the sovereignty of one’s state, or for that matter the cohesion 
of one’s nation or other societal group. 
 
There are thus different forms of security, with “national” (i.e. state) security, 
societal and human security constituting the main categories, defined by the 
different referent objects (state, societal group, individual). As threats to the 
different values of the various referent objects (sovereignty, identity and 
survival) may appear in many different shapes, all three categories have 
different “dimensions” or “sectors” such as the military, economic, and 
environmental ones. While this may make for a neat analytical framework, the 
real world is less orderly, if only because the different forms of security impinge 
upon each other, and strategies to achieve one may jeopardise the others. Hence 
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the need for a comprehensive approach to security as an integral part of 
understanding conflict. 
 
The Structure of Conflict 
Not only are conflicts “about” certain issues, which may be analytically 
disentangled as attempted above. They also exhibit specific structures, 
reflecting, among other things, the nature and goals of the conflicting parties and 
their interaction.  
 
The Number of Parties 
All conflicts pit actors against each other, even though the term “actor” may be a 
misnomer in the case of latent conflicts, in which the parties may not even be 
aware of their conflicting interests, much less act accordingly i.e. exhibiting no 
conflict behaviour. 
 
It obviously matters for the structure and pattern of the conflict how many actors 
are involved  
 
• Some conflicts are, by their very nature, dyadic as are the interpersonal 
disputes between husband and wife, the societal conflicts between Hutus and 
Tutsis in the Great Lakes Region, the international conflicts between two 
states over a piece of territory such as the Ethiopia-Eritrea war or the global 
bipolar conflict of the Cold War, which pitted two opposing alliances against 
each other, each led by a superpower. Dyadic conflicts tend to be easier to 
analyse, e.g. by means of game theory (vide infra) and often easier to solve 
(at least in the sense of devising solutions, if not of implementing them) than 
conflicts with several actors, simply because the “arithmetic” is less complex. 
• Other conflicts involve several parties, but can nevertheless reasonably be 
analysed—at least for certain purposes—as dyadic or bipolar, because the 
pattern of alignment between the parties is fairly stable, as was the case with 
the East-West conflict where it was virtually inconceivable that states might 
change sides.146 The further the analysis moved away from Europe, or the 
more it focused on the role of neutrals, however, the more misleading it 
became to view the conflict as bipolar, i.e. “quasi-dyadic”.147   
• Still other conflicts are, by their very nature, non-dyadic, i.e. polyadic or 
multipolar. Alliances between the actors shift rapidly and almost randomly—
as was, e.g. the case in the Lebanese conflict, the struggle between the 
Somali clans or those in Afghanistan.148 In such cases the balance of power (a 
rather fuzzy notion to begin with) becomes difficult to determine and a stable 
one hard to devise and even harder to realise.149 
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The misleading term notwithstanding, “third parties” are not parties to a conflict 
as such, but merely get involved in it in various capacities or combinations 
thereof as set out in Table 9 below. 
 
• As “mediators”, seeking to broker an agreement between the real parties to a 
conflict—a role traditionally assumed by states, but increasingly viewed as 
the responsibility of international organisations, and sometimes even 
attempted by NGOs. We shall revisit this topic in the following chapter on 
conflict management and resolution.. 
• As “balancers” seeking to either preserve a fragile balance of power between 
the contestants or help tipping it, e.g. in the attempt to bring about an end to 
the conflict through a victory for one side. As a means to both ends the sale 
or donation of arms is often used.150 
• As “mitigators” who do not deal with the conflict as such, but merely with its 
consequences, e.g. by providing humanitarian relief to its victims or granting 
refuge or asylum to the people fleeing from the conflict—roles which tend to 
be shared between states, international organisations (e.g. UN branches such 
as the UNHCR) and NGOs such as Médicins sans Frontieres or the Red 
Cross.  
 
Finally, of course, third parties, in their passive capacity as innocent bystanders, 
quite often find themselves as victims of a conflict—as is indeed the case of  the 
civilian population in most armed conflicts, be they international or intra-state.   
 
Dyadic Conflicts: Formal Theories 
Dyadic conflicts have exerted a particularly strong appeal to that “tribe” within 
conflict studies which seeks to apply formal theories at a very elevated level of 
abstraction to the study of conflict, treating them as games featuring actors “A” 
and “B” with a total (and deliberate) disregard for their defining features. 
  
B Table 6: Game Matrix 
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 
Alternative 1 A's Payoff, B's Payoff A's Payoff, B's Payoff A Alternative 2 A's Payoff, B's Payoff A's Payoff, B's Payoff 
 
“Game theory” is in actual fact not so much a theory as a specialised 
terminology, which is presumably suitable for describing and analysing strategic 
moves. It presupposes individual rationality on the part of the actors, and its 
level of analysis is thus not so much actual human decision-making as the 
behaviour of a homo strategicus, remarkably similar to the homo economicus of 
economic theory.151 The matrix of a typical two-person game might look as in 
Table 6. 
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A common distinction is that between “games against nature” in which one 
player is passive and unresponsive, and “games of strategy” where the two 
players interact. A further distinction is that between zero-sum, mixed-motive 
and cooperative games. 
 
During the Cold War, most attention was focused on two-person zero-sum 
games, which appeared as an adequate description of the bipolar and highly 
antagonistic set of international relations. Game theory was thus also a 
convenient language in which to formulate strategies for how to handle this 
confrontation, unfortunately mostly in confrontational ways. In zero-sum games 
the gains of one player equal the losses of the other, i.e. they are games of pure 
conflict where both sides have to focus on relative gains and losses. For 
instance, even though both might “lose” the arms race in the sense of expending 
resources without achieving a usable preponderance of strength, it might still 
make sense to “race”, if only the respective adversary would lose more than 
oneself, as this would be tantamount to a relative gain.152
 
The most extreme zero-sum game was labelled “Chicken” by nuclear strategists 
such as Herman Kahn, who wanted to justify their call for “escalation 
dominance”.153 “Chicken” depicts two (male) youngsters eager to demonstrate 
their courage by driving head-on towards each other in their cars in order to 
impress spectators (mainly girls). Whoever turns first, i.e. “chickens out”, loses 
(value -1), whereas the one who holds his course wins (value +1). However, if 
neither one turns the two drivers inevitably collide head-on and both probably 
die (value -10), as set out in Table 7. This predictable outcome has been used by 
opponents of nuclear weapons to illustrate the possible consequences of nuclear 
arms racing and posturing.  
 
B Table 7: “Chicken” 
Turn Hold Course
Turn -1,-1 -1,+1 A Hold Course +1,-1 -10,-10 
 
Game theory has, however, also been used to devise less suicidal strategies for 
such confrontational games as well as for the analysis of less confrontational 
games, i.e. cooperative and mixed-motive games. 
 
“Prisoner's Dilemma” is a mixed-motive game and might in fact be seen as a 
formal version of the security dilemma described below. Two apprehended 
criminals (A and B for short) are stipulated to be interrogated by the police 
simultaneously, but separately and without being able to communicate with each 
other. Each of them is promised a lenient sentence in return for giving evidence 
against the respective other. It is understood that if neither testifies against the 
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other, both will have to be acquitted for lack of evidence. The expected payoffs 
for the two prisoners are as set out in Table 8, where an acquittal has been given 
the value +2, a light sentence the value -1 and a harsh one that of -2. 
“Cooperation” refers to the relationship between the two prisoners, i.e. implies 
keeping silent, whereas “defection” means confessing and testifying against the 
other. Since A has no way of knowing whether B will give evidence, he has to 
assume the worst, namely that the other will indeed testify, under which 
presumption he will be better off testifying himself. Since B faces the same 
alternatives, both (according to game theory) will end up testifying against each 
other and both will be convicted (value: -1), thus doing considerably worse than 
if they had cooperated (+2). 
 
B Table 8: Prisoner's 
Dilemma Cooperate Defect 
Cooperate +2,+2 -2,-1 A Defect -1,-2 -1,-1 
 
It has been demonstrated that the prisoner’s dilemma has no “solution”, i.e. that 
both sides invariably end up with sub-optimal payoffs. The problem lies with the 
structure of the conflict (i.e. the “game”) itself rather than with the actors. Even 
though the likely outcome is clearly suboptimal for both sides (albeit not for 
society), they are likely to arrive at it, not because of irrationality, but precisely 
because they are assumed to act rationally—i.e. cautiously and selfishly—which 
is surely not an unreasonable assumption. The payoff structure is simply a recipe 
for continuing and escalating violent conflict. Hence, cooperation between 
partial adversaries may never be initiated, regardless of how mutually 
advantageous. 
 
However, it has also been shown that iterated prisoner’s dilemma games may 
lend themselves more easily to cooperation. Fortunately, this notion of long 
(sometimes of indefinite duration) series of encounters between the parties may 
be a better way of conceptualising most conflicts of the real world, where the 
same parties (be they individuals, ethnic groups or countries) tend to find 
themselves up against each other over and over again.154
 
The Security Dilemma 
Considering that, as argued above, security concerns are a salient issue in most 
political (and some other) conflicts, it is surely important whether the quest for 
security is viewed in zero-sum or variable-sum terms. Unfortunately the former 
tends to be the case at all levels of analysis, where we encounter various 
varieties of the so-called “security dilemma”. 
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• The national security dilemma is most elaborately described in IR 
literature.155 At the international level, states face the dilemma of not knowing 
whether their neighbours have aggressive or peaceful and defensive 
intentions. Hence, they have to assume the worst and prepare themselves to 
be able to defend against an attack, either by an arms build-up, by entering an 
alliance or even by striking pre-emptively. These preparations will confirm 
the suspicions of neighbouring states about aggressive intentions, and these 
states are likely to feel the need for countervailing action, thereby confirming 
the suspicions of the first state, etc. The dilemma resides in the choice 
between either preparing for a possible attack, but thereby risking bringing it 
about, or not preparing for it, thereby accepting vulnerability and possible 
extinction if an attack should occur. 
• The “societal security dilemma” is a new invention or discovery.156 The IR 
discipline’s “capital R” realists tend to simply transpose the theory of the 
security dilemma from the state to ethnic groups, conceived of as “proto-
states”—as some of them may well be, while others certainly are not. Those 
which are do, indeed, face a security dilemma very similar to that of states, 
i.e. they can only defend themselves against the respective other by means 
which will appear as threats to the other, thereby eliciting a response which 
diminishes the security of both sides. 
• The “human security dilemma” has in fact been described at length for 
centuries, albeit not labelled as such. Hobbes thus described society in the 
state of nature as a perpetual bellum omnium contra omnes. This permanent 
“state of warre”, according to Hobbes, stemmed from the basic equality of man 
in terms of abilities as well as of needs, which made every man the natural 
contender of his fellow human beings for the scarce available resources—
hence: homo homini lupus. The only escape from the resultant dilemma 
between “anticipation” (i.e. attack) and extinction was the establishment of the 
state (the “Leviathan”),157 endowed with a monopoly, or at least an 
overwhelming preponderance of power. 
 
However, if a state’s administrative capacities degenerate, including its ability to 
ensure personal safety of its citizens, it may well find itself on the path towards a 
“privatisation of security” as has happened to several states, not least in Africa.158 
If the police and other security services are unreliable, citizens and companies 
tend to resort to self-help, e.g. by soliciting the services of private security 
companies, but thereby only hastening the decline of the state’s “monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force”.159
 
Conflict Parties 
In the real world, of course, actors or conflict parties come in many shapes and 
sizes, few of which resemble the actors known from game theory or other formal 
theories.  
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Nature of the Actors 
The nature of the actors, for obvious reasons, differs from level to level as 
illustrated in Table 9, which merely lists dyadic conflicts, i.e. conflicts between 
two parties, albeit with the involvement of  “third parties”. 
 
Table 9:  Parties to Dyadic Conflicts  (examples) 
Actors 
 
Conflict Level 
Main Actor 1 Main Actor 2 “Third Parties”  
International State State 
Transnational State 
 
Guerillas 
Terrorists 
NGOs 
Refugees/IDPs 
Intrastate State 
Political party 
Militias, Guerillas 
Warlords, 
Terrorists 
 
Opposition parties 
Religious groups 
Trade unions 
Militias, Guerillas 
Warlords 
Terrorists 
Interpersonal Person Person 
Various actors: 
• States. 
• International 
Organisations (regional 
and global) 
• NGOs 
• Individuals 
In roles as: 
• Mediators 
• Balancers 
• Mitigators 
• Victims 
 
As far as the actual parties to a conflict are concerned, a number of parameters 
are significant: 
 
• Do the actors exhibit such internal cohesion that they can reasonably be 
analysed as unitary actors, or do they exhibit such internal divisions that they 
must be treated as plural. While some analysist, particularly of the “realist” 
persuasion such as Kenneth Waltz insist on treating states as unitary actors, 
others view state policies as “outputs” produced by the “inputs” from various 
subnational actors struggling among themselves.160 As far as non-state, but 
still collective, actors are concerned, they tend to be (correctly) viewed and 
analysed as comprising different groups with different agendas. For instance, 
while one would often refer to “Israel” as a unitary actor, few serious 
analysist would treat “the Palestinian resistance” as one.161 
• To which categories do the actors belong? Some may be states, which may or 
may not be treated as unitary actors, while others are societal groupings of 
various kinds, institutions or even individuals. 
• Is the conflict “symmetrical”, pitting like units against each other, or 
asymmetrical in the sense of taking place between actors belonging to 
different categories? Traditional wars were, by definition, conflicts between 
“like units” (differering in size, location etc, but not in terms of nature).162 
Most other conflicts, however, are asymmetrical. Either they pit the state as 
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an institution, or the incumbent regime, against rebels of various sorts or 
transnational foes such as terrorist networks;163 or they pit groups or persons 
against each other, which may or may not belong to the same “species” or 
“genus”, e.g. religious fanatics against people who want to keep politics and 
religion separate.  
• What resources do the actors have at their disposal, are these of the same 
kind and, if so, what is the balance of power between the actors, if indeed one 
can be determined? This may not be the case when the conflicting parties are 
strong in different dimensions as was, for instance, the case in the long 
struggle between the communist regime in Poland and the Catholic Church. 
Whereas the former was stronger in material terms, the latter’s strength was 
“symbolic”.   
• What are the goals and strategies of the actors? The following section is 
devoted to this question.  
 
Conflict Goals 
Irrespectively of the issue of contention, the conflicting parties may have 
different objectives and act upon these in different ways, in both cases with a 
significant impact on the structure of the conflict as such as well as on the 
opportunities for conflict prevention, mitigation and resolution. The aims may 
be arranged along a continuum of moderation and radicalism, as in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Conflict Goals 
Moderate  Radical 
Recognition    Rights     Equality    Privilege    Domination    Expulsion     Extermination 
 
• Recognition: The most moderate aims is to be recognised as a party to the 
conflict, which is not always self-evident. Just think of the struggle of the 
Palestinians to be recognised as a nation (as opposed to being mere a 
segment of a larger Arab nation) and that of the PLO to be acknowledged as 
their legitimate representative.164 
• Rights: Next comes the achievement of some specified entitlements, be that 
in terms of human rights or of material goods.165 
• Equality: Still moderate are claims for “equality” in the same respects—
something which is often less “fair” and equitable that it might appear at first 
glance, especially when applied to groups (e.g. in the form of equality 
between a majority and a minority). Nevertheless, it has the advantage that it 
can, by its very definition, be enjoyed by both sides simultaneously.   
• Privilege, on the other hand, is something which one side enjoys over the 
other and thus usually at the other’s expense. 
• Domination is an even more radical objective, if only because it can only be 
enjoyed by one side to a conflict at the expense of the other. Only one can be 
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“king of the hill”. However, it does not automatically rule out the granting of 
specific rights to the dominated party. 
• Expulsion is a very radical objective, tantamount to striving to be “alone on 
the hill” by means of ethnic (or other) “cleansing”, as happened in the former 
Yugoslavia. Its appeal tends to be strongest in protracted conflicts 
characterised by widespread violence (or even genocide), when two groups 
have developed such an intense mistrust of each other that co-habitation 
seems intolerable to one or, indeed, both sides. Radical though it is, even this 
objective may allow for compromise, e.g. in the form of secession-cum-
relocation.166     
• Extermination is the most radical objective that any conflict party can pursue, 
namely to get rid of the other side once and for all. On the interpersonal 
level, it simply means killing the other party, while at the collective (i.e. 
societal) level it is tantamount to killing the members of the opposing 
group—as the Nazi party attempted with regard to the Jews and the extreme 
Hutus in Rwanda with regard to the Tutsis (and moderate Hutus) in 1994. For 
obvious reasons such an objective does not lend really itself to compromise 
at all. 
 
Conflict Behaviour 
Not all conflicting sides to all conflicts behave in the same way. Behaviour 
differs not merely because of different objectives, but also as a function of the 
means at the disposal of each side. It thus makes sense to make distinctions with 
regard to the means employed by the competing sides. They may be arranged 
according to the degree of violence, ranging from the peaceful voicing of 
grievances to fully-fledged genocide. 
 
• Dialogue is obviously the most pacific way of dealing with conflicts and one 
for which democracies are renowned.167 In many cases, however, the very 
setting for dialogue is highly controversial, and cultural divides may hamper 
mutual understanding, even within countries.168 
• Non-violent means of coercion. There are numerous ways of  “fighting out” a 
conflict by non-violent means, including elections, demonstrations, strikes, 
etc.169 Some are, as opposed to dialogue, openly confrontational, even though 
they do not employ physical violence.   
• Sporadic violence sometimes occurs spontaneously, e.g. by individual 
members of opposing groups acting on their own behalf. Unfortunately, this 
may generate an escalatory momentum, by providing the “victimised” party 
with motives for “getting even”, etc. Beyond a certain point, the use of 
violence may come to be seen as justified and “normal”. 
• Massive and systematic violence may either occur as a result of things thus 
getting out of control, or it may be used as a deliberate strategy by one side, 
e.g. for intimidation and coercion—as may well have been the rationale for 
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atrocities committed by the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) against 
civilians, including its infamous use of amputations.   
• Genocide represents the most radical and violent form of conflict 
behaviour,170 one party seeking the violent extermination of the respective 
other, as was the case of the 1994 Rwandan genocide.  
 
The Psychological Dimension 
Part of the explanation why conflicts may escalate to such extremes as genocide 
is to be found within the minds of the conflicting sides. 
 
The most simplistic answer to the puzzle of motivation can be fairly easily 
dismissed, namely that human beings are inherently aggressive. There are, of 
course, various biological and psychological theories, which argue along these 
lines, but also ample evidence to the contrary.171 Rather than killing instinctively, 
man seems (as many other species) to “suffer” from an instinctive aversion to 
killing members of his own species, which must (and can) be overcome through 
training.172 Psychopaths and sociopaths do, of course, exist, but they are 
(fortunately) far too rare to provide any satisfactory explanation for the frequent 
occurrence of atrocities in conflicts.  
 
Social (as opposed to individual) psychology may provide better clues to 
understanding what makes people in special social contexts behave 
aggressively—i.e. how they are socialised to accept and even to personally 
perpetrate violence.173 In the realm of individual as well as social psychology we 
find a number of theories about how people perceive their environment, which 
may go some way towards explaining their behaviour. Human perception and 
cognition simply exhibit certain patters, which may help understand the 
propensity for aggression. 
 
For instance, in order to better grasp and cope with their environment people 
almost automatically strive to avoid “cognitive dissonance”, i.e. they seek to 
interpret their observations in such a way as to reduce seeming inconsistencies, 
such as a friend behaving wrongfully or a foe acting benevolently.174 
Furthermore, there is an almost inescapable tendency to apply different 
standards to one’s own behaviour and that of an adversary—simply because one 
can ascertain one’s own motives directly through introspection, whereas one has 
to deduce those of others from their actions. Such actions always lend 
themselves to several different interpretations and the selection process is likely 
to be influenced by the quest for cognitive consonance. Even seemingly benign 
acts by an actor categorised as malevolent may be construed as tactical moves 
intended to make oneself less alert to the next (and presumably malignant) 
move. Conversely, the apparently malignant actions on the part of oneself or 
friends can easily be construed as enforced, i.e. as reactions to the actual or 
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anticipated moves by the malevolent adversary. 
 
From such misperceptions and misinterpretations may develop “enemy images”, 
which are almost impervious to refutation. They add venom to any conflict, as 
the enemy is seen as not merely pursuing conflicting interests, but as being 
malevolent or even evil—as in U.S. President Bush’s labelling the U.S. 
adversaries an “axis of evil”.175  Such labelling may easily set in motion an 
interactive cycle that could lead to violent confrontation.176
 
A field of special attention for psychologists preoccupied with conflict (or for 
political scientists and conflict analysts interested in psychology) has been cases 
where small groups of individuals, because of their special position in society, 
may take decisions of potentially nationwide or even universal significance. 
This was the case when the leaders of the two superpowers contemplated their 
behaviour vis-à-vis each other—most dramatically and well documented in the 
1962 Cuban missile crisis which could have triggered a nuclear war and thereby 
global conflagration.177 In such settings, decisions are presumably heavily 
influenced by perceptional factors and various social psychological mechanisms 
which may well produce irrational behaviour, caused by combinations of stress 
and “group-think”. The latter mechanism, well documented from psychological 
experiments, makes a group of individuals think increasingly along similar lines, 
thereby removing alternative options from consideration. While this may be 
conducive to such concerted action as is required in an intense crisis, it can also 
produce decisions with disastrous implications.178    
 
Entire nations or cultures may arguably develop such “group-think” in the sense 
of enemy images or permissive attitudes to violence which are shared by all 
members of the community due to socialisation. This phenomenon has long 
been described by anthropologists who have identified both “cultures of 
violence” and profoundly peaceful and non-violent societies.179 More recently 
the phenomena of ideas and culture have also been taken up by IR scholars.180 
This phenomenon is closely related to that of  (national or group) “identity”, as 
human collectives tend to identify themselves through culture, but typically also 
by being different from “the Other”—which often leads to hostility towards this 
Other and arguably sometimes even presupposes violence, which confirms 
“otherness” and thus also one’s own identity.181 One way of analysing these 
patterns of identification and “otherisation” is through discourse analysis, which 
can also uncover hidden patterns of attribution and framing in the language 
used.182 Discourse analysis has also been applied to explaining the behaviour of 
states, e.g. in arms races,183 and to understanding terrorist acts against states as a 
form of communication.184  
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One particular field of discourse is, of course, the mass media, which exhibit all 
of the above features such as group-think and enemy images—and which have 
the potential of almost causing war and at least of creating permissive attitudes 
towards the use of violence in the general public.185 A particularly nasty example 
of this was the “hate radio” in Rwanda prior to and during the 1994 genocide.186 
However, also advanced states have deliberately used the media as part of their 
war efforts. 
   
Conflict Patterns  
Regardless of their causes and the parties involved, conflicts tend to exhibit 
certain patterns of evolution, i.e. to follow certain paths. To identify these paths 
is often a precondition for understanding them and, even more so, of managing 
and even resolve them. 
 
Causal Paths  
Monocausality is rare, as conflicts often have several, mutually reinforcing, 
structural (or “root”) causes which interact, thereby creating a path of conflict. It 
is thus often possible to trace (at least retrospectively) the path of a conflict from 
its latent stage to that of open and violent strife. Fig. 1.4 illustrates merely one 
such possible conflict path, the root cause of which is stipulated to be a scarcity 
of natural resources, as is a far too common situation, not least in Africa.187  
 
At the root of the conflict may thus be a simple fact of nature such as a 
mismatch between population growth and the available (constant or only slowly 
expanding) pool of resources, producing what might be called a “Malthusian 
squeeze”.188 The inhabitants may seek to squeeze more out of the finite resource 
pool available to them, but this will, at best, provide some temporary relief and 
the resources will be exhausted even faster. Alternatively, they may leave the 
country (as voluntary emigrants or as refugees) in search of better living 
conditions elsewhere—or they may stay put but suffer growing hardships as a 
consequence. In the latter case, a conflict over the distribution of available 
resources and jobs (a “cake-sharing dispute”) is likely to ensue which may well 
become intense or even violent. 
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Fig. 1.4: Illustrative Causal Path of a Conflict 
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If the population in question contains easily distinguishable ethnic or other 
groups and strata, these distinctions are also likely to be played upon by leaders 
claiming privileges for their respective groups—or opposing what they see as 
the privileges enjoyed by other groups. Even though the roots of the conflict 
may be economic, it may thus become “ethnicized”—something which may also 
come about in neighbouring countries as a result of the aforementioned 
migration and refugee flows. This may happen either directly or via the struggle 
over scarce resources, which is likely to become more fierce when “aliens” also 
have to be fed and housed.  In its turn, the violent conflict may well produce 
additional refugees and internally displaced persons, thereby exacerbating both 
the economic and the ethnic conflict. In the light of the growing food shortage in 
Southern Africa by 2002189 this is, alas, not an unlikely forecast for the region for 
the years to come.  
 
The conflict may also become internationalised (vide supra), e.g. via its 
ethnification which may draw in the “ethnic kin” abroad of one or all of the 
opposing ethnic groups, via attempts at solving the problem of scarce resources 
through conquest,190 or via cross-border refugee flows. In its turn, the 
involvement of external actors in the conflict is just as likely to exacerbate it as 
to help solving it. 
 
The Conflict Cycle 
Provided that structural causes of conflict exist and that the latent conflict is 
sufficiently severe, virtually any event may serve as the proximate cause or 
trigger of an open conflict. In many cases it is an unpopular political decision 
which is seen as  “the last straw”, but overt conflicts may also be set in motion 
by, e.g., acts of oppression such as the police cracking down on a demonstration, 
closing an oppositional newspaper or the like. 
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Even after having been set in motion, conflicts do not usually escalate in a linear 
fashion, as there are usually “thresholds” which must be crossed along the way. 
Just where these thresholds are situated depends very much on context and 
history, as it is usually a matter of perceptions and social constructions. In some 
countries police clubbing or tear-gassing demonstrators may, for instance, be 
seen as normal, whereas in others it may suffice for crossing a threshold. Taking 
this notion of thresholds as the point of departure, it makes sense to depict the 
“typical” evolution of a conflict as a “conflict cycle” as set out in Fig. 5 below.191
 
Fig. 5: The Conflict Cycle 
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continuing the struggle, if only to “get even” or in order to escape retribution 
for atrocities already committed. Moreover, in this phase leadership is often 
usurped by people pursuing their various private agendas and often 
personally profiting from the continuing struggle.   
• Fourth comes the escalation phase where violence breeds further violence, 
producing an escalatory momentum. Moreover, the longer the struggle has 
lasted, and the more destructive it has been, the more do the warring parties 
(and especially their leaders) have to lose by laying down their arms. Only 
victory can justify the preceding bloodshed and other “sunk costs”, hence the 
proclivity to struggle on as long as there is even a slight hope of prevailing, 
thereby attaining the power to set the terms.. 
• Eventually, however, the escalation comes to a halt, either because one side 
prevails or because both sides have temporarily exhausted their supply of 
weaponry. In the latter case, the conflict enters its contained phase. The 
struggle continues, but its intensity tends to decline. 
• The conflict may thus evolve into its abated phase, where the basic causes 
of conflict remain in place, but where conflict behaviour has been 
significantly altered—with less violence and more political mobilisation and 
negotiation. At this stage, the prospects of post-conflict recovery begin to 
loom large in the minds of political leaders on opposing sides, and external 
actors may thus gain new leverage, e.g. as potential (but not unconditional) 
providers of aid. 
• The resolution phase is arguably the most critical of them all, as success or 
failure of “post-conflict peace-building” will determine whether the conflict 
will flare up again Such success presupposes that both the underlying causes 
of the conflict and its immediate consequences are addressed. If  not, the 
conflict cycle is likely to enter a new round. 
 
Summary 
We have thus seen that conflicts are, indeed, complex phenomena. On the other 
hand, quite a lot is, in fact known about their various causes, underlying 
motives, structures and dynamics as well as their typical evolution.  
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